

in the second century AD and modern times. The volume ends with Armand d'Angour's Chapter 11, "The New Music – so what's new?" with illustrative examples of what does or does not constitute a technological breakthrough in music.

Taking into account the vast range of topics and the amount of erudition shed on the pages of this volume, it is difficult to even try to assess the book in a holistic manner. One thing, however, is common to every chapter of the book: we are very much dealing with scholarly waves of emphasising one piece of evidence pro or contra another. And another thing is also true throughout this volume: revolution or no, the essays in the book offer many interesting (re-)thoughts both about Antiquity and the way we have formed our views on what might be claimed to be revolutionary about the classical Greek world.

Erja Salmenkivi

VINCENT FARENGA: *Citizen and Self in the Greek City State. Individuals Performing Justice and the Law*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006. ISBN 0-521-84559-9. IX, 592 pp. GBP 62, USD 90.

Vincent Farenga's *Citizen and Self in Ancient Greece* is a hefty monograph with an ambitious scope: as the title suggests, the author looks at how the performance of justice interacted with ideas of the individual or "self". The timespan ranges from the Early Iron Age to the Classical and the sources used from Homer to Attic orators. Farenga states performance theory as his main theoretical framework and sees citizenship itself as performative.

Farenga follows the development of the performance of justice from Homeric chiefdoms to Athenian democracy. For the Early Iron Age, he looks at archaeological reconstructions of social complexity but above all at Homer. In the first chapter, he argues that in the tumultuous times following the Mycenaean collapse it was crucial to establish a sense of past and continuity. In Homer, this is shown by laments: they were an attempt by the kin to assert the value of their dead, which others would either acknowledge (by joining in the laments) or reject (by, for example, lamenting their *own* dead instead). Achilles is here seen as a trailblazer as he asserts his autonomy from Agamemnon and the rest of the community.

From this, Farenga moves on to the development of the basis of justice, running through chapters two to six. In Homeric society, *basileis* were myth-tellers as well as contemporary leaders, and they could take up the roles of any of the parties involved in a dispute in order to resolve it. As magistrates and jurors were introduced after 700 BCE, a new role model was needed to justify the jurisdictional power of this new group. Farenga argues the figure of Odysseus provided a framework for this, showing how multiple perspectives (as he encounters during his travels) are needed for good judgments. The situation changed again in the mid-7th century with written laws. Here Farenga sees parallels between lawgivers and poets (apart from the obvious overlap with Solon) and the increasing shift from popular sovereignty to close adherence and identification with lawgivers – the impersonality of justice, if you will. Finally, the last chapter looks at Alcibiades and Socrates as autonomous agents but with the latter acknowledging the supremacy of laws. Thus we see a movement from highly idiosyncratic justice – stemming, however, from a common mythical past – towards an ideal of impersonal judgments, this time stemming from commonly acknowledged wise lawgivers. It is here worth

noting how the idea of an "absolute", non-subjective law and justice was associated with good citizenship and character in general: Farenga gives examples of how the jurors themselves were "on trial", judged based on the judgments they made.

Citizen and Self in Ancient Greece is top-heavy with theory. This is not unwelcome in a field that is sometimes accused of lack of explicit theory, but it does make the monograph heavy reading and, at times, difficult to follow for someone not familiar with the theoretical scholarship. Farenga certainly seems to push his readings a bit far at times, but *Citizen and Self in Ancient Greece* still provides an interesting approach to topics frequently studied, as well as an experiment in how to explicitly apply a theoretical framework to literary material.

Elina M. Salminen

SUSAN LAPE: *Race and Citizen Identity in the Classical Athenian Democracy*. Cambridge University Press, New York 2010. ISBN 978-0-521-19104-3. XII, 341 pp. GBP 55, USD 90.

In this book, Susan Lape looks at Athenian citizenship during the Classical period: how and why it was controlled, how definitions changed depending on the circumstances, and also why the boundary between citizen and non-citizen was so important. The word "race" in the title is bound to raise some questions, and Lape explains her usage of the term. The term, simultaneously ambiguous and heavily burdened by 19th and 20th-century ideologies, in Lape's work mainly refers to social identities that revolve around ancestry and the importance of not mixing Athenian and non-Athenian blood, supported by myths of autochthony and thus Athenians "belonging" to a specific territory.

Lape draws on written sources ranging from drama to epigraphy as well as anthropologists, Classicists and historians. She starts off by summarizing the development of laws and decrees on citizen status starting with Draco and continuing on to Pericles. She utilizes anthropological theory – including the monstrous term "social actor" for a person – to explain the tendency for stricter limitations on what qualified for a citizen. Although a complicated system with many variables, it largely functioned pragmatically. Control of citizen status allowed for privileges on one hand, and for an illusion of equality on the other: metics could be taxed more heavily and citizens less, while an "equal" status as citizens lessened conflict and bitterness between economic classes.

While Lape says she focuses on things Athenian citizens had in common, in order to do this she looks at trials and comedic plays that outline why someone was not an Athenian (Chapter 2). Poor character ran hand in hand with mixed or otherwise suspicious ancestry: an impostor could be recognized by a lack of love for democracy and other Athenian virtues. In an interesting section she discusses the role gender played in lawsuits against supposed impostors. Since women were largely isolated from the public sphere, it was easy to question their legitimacy or their marital status. At the same time, Lape points out trials were often between family members, making accusations of illegitimacy a risky business to say the least.

Chapters three and four are case studies on tragedy and historiography respectively. Lape sees opposing ideas regarding reproduction in Euripides' *Ion*: Creousa is the one preserving the Athenian bloodline, but at the same time Apollo, by raping her, makes her less than an active agent. In other words, the play acknowledges the importance of female bloodlines and